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Once there was a concept that a person injured through the fault
of another should be allowed to recover his damages from the party at
fault. However, in 1965, two professors decided that such an archaic
concept should be changed when applied to innocent victims of
automobile accidents.'
Since 1970, twenty-four states have agreed with Professors
Keeton and O'Connell and have enacted various forms of no-fault
motor vehicle laws.2 The alleged reason for making this change was,
as the words "no-fault" suggest, that everyone injured should be en-
titled to recover his economic loss regardless of who was at fault.3
However, to those who fought against legislative enactment of no-
fault laws the reason was obvious. Automobile insurance rates were
climbing and the public demanded relief. Without the presence of
high automobile insurance rates, no-fault probably would have had
as much chance of legislative approval as the proverbial snowball.
This conclusion can best be supported by the clamor raised for enact-
ment of a no-fault products liability law when the rates for products
liability insurance soared.
It is the purpose of this article to examine no-fault from a trial
lawyer's viewpoint by way of a thorough look at the Florida ex-
perience.
*B.S.-B.A. 1958, LL.B. 1961, University of Florida; Partner Levin, Warfield, Mid-
dlebrooks, Mabie, Rosenbloum & Magie, P.A., Pensacola, Florida.
1R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECrION FOR THE TRAimc Vicrim (1965).
'Siedel, The Constitutionality of No-Fault Insurance: The Courts Speak, 26 DRAKE L.
REV. 794 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Siedel]. The twenty-four states which at one time
had no-fault legislation are: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Nine states have since repealed their no-fault
legislation: Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, and Virginia.
'As to the alleged reasons for no-fault legislation, the author has never heard a per-
son who was totally at fault in an accident state that he felt that he should recover his
economic loss.
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WHAT Is NO-FAULT?
At common law the innocent victim of a tort could recover his
economic injuries, that is medical bills and wage losses, as well as
pain and suffering damages from the party who caused him injury.
The no-fault concept alters this by requiring the injured person to
recover economic losses from his own insurance carrier. The innocent
victim thus compensated by his own insurance for economic injuries
then gives up his claim for pain and suffering damages against the
tortfeasor.
The insurance coverage which protects the innocent victim or
first party is called Person Injury Protection (P.I.P.). The nature and
extent of P.I.P. coverage varies among the no-fault states.' For exam-
ple, in Massachusetts $2,000 is the maximum recoverable for
economic losses,' but in Michigan an unlimited recovery is allowed
for medical bills and a $36,000 ceiling is placed on wage losses.6 The
state plans also vary as to the requirement of a medical threshold
which must be reached by the injured first party in order to make a
pain and suffering claim. For example, in New Jersey an innocent vic-
tim must have at least $200 in medical bills to make a pain and suffer-
ing claim,' however, Minnesota requires a $2,000 threshold.8 In other
states a verbal threshold is required to be reached in order to make the
pain and suffering claim.9 Michigan's verbal threshold requires a per-
manent injury.' 0
On January 1, 1972, Florida's no-fault law went into effect. The
Florida P.I.P. coverage paid 100% of medical bills and 85% of wage
loss up to a total recovery of $5,000." In order to recover pain and
suffering damages, the innocent victim of a motor vehicle accident
'This right to claim damages varies from state to state according to the particular
no-fault law.
'MASS. ANN. LAWS ch 90, § 34A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975). See also State No-Fault
Automobile Insurance Experience, Florida Department of Transportation 9 (June 1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 State No-Fault Insurance Experience].
'MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107 (Supp. 1979). See also 1977 State No-Fault In-
surance Experience, supra note 5. at 9.
'N. J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-B (West 1973). See also 1977 State No-Fault Insurance Ex-
perience, supra note 5, at 10.
'MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A. 1494 (West 1970). See also 1977 State No-Fault Insurance
Experience, supra note 5, at 9.
'Some statutes allow tort actions for pain and suffering when the medical expenses
exceed a specified amount; see notes 7, 8, and accompanying textual material, supra.
There are certain types of injuries, however, that involve considerable pain and suffer-
ing yet do not reach the medical threshold. A verbal threshold may be reached by allow-
ing a medical doctor's testimony of the permanent injury, permanent dismemberment,
or serious injury notwithstanding the lack of medical bills.
"MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3135() (Supp. 1979). See also 1977 State No-Fault
Insurance Experience, supra note 5. at 9.
"FLA. STAT. § 627.'736(1972).
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had to have incurred at least $1,000 in medical bills." The pro-
ponents of no-fault successfully argued that the $1,000 threshold
would eliminate 92% of all bodily injury claims as a result of motor
vehicle accidents.'" The Florida Legislature also mandated a 15%
reduction in the rates for bodily injury liability coverage (including
P.I.P.) from the previous year's bodily injury liability coverage
premiums.'
On paper, the Florida no-fault plan was actuarially sound. Of
course, it didn't take an actuary to tell a person that bodily injury
liability rates would come down substantially if 92% of the bodily in-
jury liability cases were eliminated. But, it was too good to be true.
Everyone got his economic losses paid, the seriously injured could still
recover for pain and suffering damages and motor vehicle insurance
premiums were coming down. Unfortunately, there were a couple of
documents-the Constitutions of Florida and the United States-that
stood between this beautiful concept and it becoming a reality.
Is NO-FAULT CONSTITUTIONAL?
Even though the framers of the Constitution knew nothing of
automobiles or no-fault laws, the constitutional guarantees of equal
protection, due process and access to courts, have stood the test of
time and may be applied to these situations. Certainly the law pro-
fessors who conceived and proposed no-fault recognized these con-
stitutional guarantees. The United States Supreme Court in 1917 ap-
proved workmen's compensation as an alternative remedy to the com-
mon law tort stating that there was no constitutional violation if the
change provided a reasonable alternative to the pre-existing common
law right.'5
Following the Supreme Court reasoning the Florida Supreme
Court ruled no-fault constitutional by holding that P.I.P. was a
reasonable alternative to a claim for pain and suffering.' 6 In Lasky,
the court justified its position by stating repeatedly that the common
law right of pain and suffering was being replaced by this reasonable
alternative in only a very limited number of cases.'
How would the Florida Supreme Court decide if the right to
claim damages for pain and suffering was being taken from innocent
victims in the great majority of motor vehicle cases? The court may
soon have the opportunity to decide this question. Effective January 1,
1979, the threshold for pain and suffering damages in Florida became
"FLA. STAT. § 627.737 (1972).
"Automobile Personal Injury Claims, Florida Department of Transportation (1970).
'
4FLA. STAT. § 627.741 (1972).
"New York Cent. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
"Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
"Id. at 14.
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"permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probabil-
ity .. .",a
It can be argued that Florida's new threshold requirement is un-
constitutional. One reason is that the victim's accessability to the
courts for pain and suffering claims is made dependent upon a deter-
mination by the medical profession. The new no-fault law grants im-
munity to a motor vehicle tortfeasor unless a member of the medical
profession says the innocent victim has incurred a permanent injury.
Thus the victim is dependent on the medical profession to obtain his
day in court. This requirement is different from the testimony elicited
from a physician as to the permanency of an injury. The latter inci-
dent goes only to the question of evidence and damages and not to
whether the action may be brought to court at all. No court has ever
allowed the question of access to court to be delegated. Even if such a
delegation were permissible, it should not be made to the medical pro-
fession, which, in most instances, has various opinions as to the per-
manency of an injury.
The most important constitutional hurdle that Florida's new
threshold requirement must overcome is the denial of access to the
courts which may result if the medical determination prohibits a
substantial number of cases from being brought. What may have been
a reasonable alternative to a claim for pain and suffering in a very
few cases, may not be a reasonable alternative when it eliminates
substantial rights in the great majority of the cases.
In Lasky, the Florida Supreme Court left the door open when it
stated:
It may seem from the above discussion that we are ascribing conse-
quences to our no-fault insurance law which have yet to be
demonstrated, and which may turn out to be non-existent. What we ac-
tually are doing is presuming the existence of circumstances supporting
the validity of the Legislature's action, in the absence of any evidence to
the contrary."'
As noted by Professor Siedel:
Despite the decisions upholding the general nature of no-fault in-
surance, no-fault advocates face a major problem which has not yet
been thoroughly considered by the courts. As noted by Feminist Ingrid
Bergis: "I am very wary of conclusions that precede the experience."
All of the no-fault decisions to date have "preceded the experience" and
for this reason the courts have placed great reliance on legislative deter-
mination of the necessity for no-fault insurance."0
"FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (b) (Supp. 1978).
"296 So. 2d at 17.
"Siedel, supra note 2, at 823 (footnote omitted).
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Is P.I.P. A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE?
The constitutionality of Florida's no-fault act was grounded on
the theory that the legislature can provide a reasonable alternative to
the traditional tort. action as was done with the enactment of
workmen's compensation. However, there are vast differences bet-
ween the employee contractually consenting to this reasonable alter-
native as with workmen's compensation and the situation between the
injured claimant and the negligent tortfeasor, who prior to the acci-
dent have never met.
In 1972 when Florida's no-fault law went into effect, nine out of
ten Americans were protected by one or more forms of private health
insurance and others had similar coverage through Medicare and
Medicaid.2 At the same time, seven out of eight workers were covered
by disability income protection coverage.22 By the end of 1976, nine
out of ten Americans under age sixty-five were protected by private
health insurance." Sixty percent of those over sixty-five had private
health insurance in addition to Medicare.' 4 Furthermore, three out of
four Americans under age sixty-five were protected by some form of
"catastrophic" private health insurance. " The percentage of medical
bills paid by health insurance as a result of accidents in 1977 was
88.2%.2 In 1976, 77.4 million persons out of an employed civilian
labor force of 85.4 million persons" were protected by disability in-
come protection." Therefore, over 90% of the employed civilians
were protected in 1976 by private insurance for disability income
protection exclusive of Social Security.
Nine out of ten Floridians already have medical insurance which
pays 88.2% of medical bills related to an accident." The no-fault law
requires these people to purchase additional coverage (P.I.P) which
pays 80% of medical bills related to automobile accidents." Futher-
more, the 90% of working Floridians who have private disability in-
come protection are required to purchase P.I.P. which covers 60% of
gross earnings.3'
"Ring, The Fault With "No-Fault," 49 NOTatE DAME LAw. 796, 798 (1974).
"Source Book of Health Insurance Data 1972-73 at 25, Health Insurance Institute
(1972).





"U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 355
(1976).
"Id. at 31.
"'his figure is based on the assumption that the national percentage of medical bills
paid by health insurance is indicative of the percentage paid by health insurance in
Florida.
"FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (a) (Supp. 1978).
"ld. § 627.736(1) (b) (Supp. 1978).
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To summarize, it may be assumed that 90% of Floridians have
private insurance to cover medical bills and wage losses." If these
people were the innocent victims of an automobile accident, P.I.P.
combined with their private medical coverage enables them in effect
to take double recovery for economic losses as a substitute for the pre-
no-fault right to go against the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. Double
recovery may also be obtained if the person is at fault in the accident.
However, the person at fault gives up no right to seek redress in the
courts since he never had such a right. When it is recognized that most
group coverages have coordination of benefits provisions that prevent
a person from recovering more than 100% of his medical losses (in-
cluding P.I.P.), it is realized that many innocent accident victims
receive nothing for giving up their right to sue the tortfeasor for
economic losses and pain and suffering. Florida allows for substantial
deductibles where there is private health insurance.3 1 In the situation
of a substantial deductible, the injured person would receive his
medical bills and disability income protection from his private health
insurance3 4 thus again forfeiting his right to claim damages for
economic losses and pain and suffering from the tortfeasor.
It appears that the innocent victim, at the very best, receives some
unnecessary double coverage for giving up his rights against the tort-
feasor. In many situations, the innocent victim, because of coordina-
tion of benefits through group insurance or because of a deductible
through P.I.P. coverage, receives nothing for giving up these rights.
When considering the constitutionality of no-fault the primary con-
cern should be the innocent victim since he has given up a right he
possessed under the traditional tort system. The party at fault had no
such right, notwithstanding comparative negligence laws. Seemingly,
even the most staunch proponents of no-fault would be hard-pressed
to argue that a portion of innocent victims receiving double recovery
is a reasonable alternative to the right of all innocent victims to
recover.
Proponents of no-fault have argued that the existence of unin-
sured tortfeasors prevents innocent victims from recovering in the
traditional tort system against the uninsureds. The counter argument
to this is to make some assumptions by examining the percentage of
Floridians who have no private insurance to cover medical bills or
wage loss. Reports show that 10% of Floridians do not have private
health insurance.3 5 Before no-fault, if the 10% weie the innocent vic-
"See note 29, supra.
"Id. § 627.739 (Supp. 1978).
"Since the insured is allowed to deduct up to $8,000 from the P.I.P. coverage under
the statute, it appears that most persons would choose to accept coverage under their
own private health insurance, rather than forgo the initial $8,000 to proceed under
P.I.P.
sSee notes 23, 29, supra.
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tims of an automobile accident, they could have recovered medical
and wage loss against the tortfeasor. Assuming that the 10% were in-
volved in an accident and half of them were innocent victims, then
5% of the total accident victims in Florida would not have their
economic losses paid because they either did not have private health
insurance or were at fault in the accident. After passage of the no-
fault law, what happens to the 10% without private health insurance?
The Florida Department of Insurance estimates that more than 10%
of the motor vehicles in Florida are uninsured.38 It is submitted that it
would be a reasonable assumption that the 10% who have no private
health insurance are more than likely the same 10% who have no
motor vehicle liability insurance and after no-fault, no P.I.P.
coverage. Again, let's assume that half of the 10% without private
health insurance were innocent victims of an accident. Since these
persons are more than likely individuals who also do not have P.I.P.
coverage, under the Florida no-fault law, these uninsured, innocent
victims would be unable to recover anything. Under the present
Florida law, if a motor vehicle is uninsured, the accident victim can-
not be paid P.I.P. and also cannot claim damages from the
tortfeasor" At least, prior to no-fault, the innocent victim of an acci-
dent who did not have private health insurance and did not have his
own motor vehicle insured could recover his economic losses (as well
as pain and suffering) from the negligent tortfeasor.
The net effect of P.I.P. is to require 90% of Floridians to purchase
double coverage and to prevent the remaining 10% from recovering
medical bills and wage loss that they could have recovered under the
pure tort law if they were innocent victims. P.I.P., therefore, could be
found to result in less people having their medical bills and wage loss
paid than would be paid under a pure tort action. P.I.P. allows some
innocent accident victims to make a claim against the tortfeasor for
both economic losses and damages for pain and suffering. But can a
double recovery for some innocent accident victims possibly be so
beneficial as to make P.I.P. a reasonable alternative for all innocent
accident victims?
DOUBLE COVERAGE Is DISASTROUS
It is submitted that P.I.P., in fact, gives no realistic beneficial ef-
fect to the injured victim of an automobile accident and causes less
people to recover economic losses than would have been able to
recover under a pure tort action. The only possible beneficial effect of
P.I.P. is a doubk recovery for a portion of the innocent accident vic-
tims. It is the purpose of this section of the article to show that not on-
"A Program to Solve the Automobile Insurance Rate Crisis, Office of Treasurer and
Insurance Commission of Florida Department of Insurance 5 (1977).
"FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (Supp. 1978).
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ly is the beneficial possibility nonexistent, but that the detrimental ef-
fect of double recovery is even greater than the opponents of no-fault
could ever imagine.
The no-fault law required all automobile owners to purchase
P.I.P. At the time the Florida Legislature enacted no-fault, nine out of
ten Americans were protected by one or more forms of private health
insurance38 and seven out of eight working Americans were covered
by disability income protection." P.I.P., it could be argued, created
unneeded double coverage for these people.
Prior to no-fault, when a wage earner was injured in an
automobile accident, his employer's or his own disability income in-
surance paid a percentage of his wages tax free, for example, 60%,
while he was disabled from work. After no-fault, the injured wage
earner would still receive 60% of wages tax free from his own per-
sonal coverage or from his employer's but in addition he immediately
received 85%"0 of his wages tax free from the no-fault coverage. The
injured wage earner could thus stay at home and draw almost one and
a half times his gross wages, tax free. Instead of missing a few days
from work, the injured wage earner found it very profitable to stay
away from work as long as possible.4' The result was that the disabili-
ty for the innocent victim became much more serious. Likewise, the
culpable accident victim and even the victim of a one-car accident
were offered an incentive to stay home.
A like situation occurred with medical expenses. Prior to no-fault,
private health insurance paid approximately 80% of all medical bills
incurred whether as a result of accident or sickness. Following no-
fault, the injured accident victim received 100%12 of his medical ex-
penses through the no-fault coverage in addition to his other medical
coverage. Therefore, the accident victim was receiving $180 for every
$100 in medical bills. No-fault created an incentive for the accident
victim to get as much medical care and as expensive care as he could
possibly obtain.
Before no-fault, the health care provider would refuse to give any
type of medical care (other than emergency care) without being paid
in full. The accident victim was required to pay in advance the dif-
ference between what his insurance carrier would pay and the
amount of the medical bill. Hardly a day went by when a personal in-
"See note 2 1, supra.
"See note 22, supra.
"Since 1977, this figure has been 60%. See FLA. STAT. § 627.736(l) (b) (Supp. 1978).
"There are no statistics based on the human element. The human element under
Florida no-fault discussed in this article is based upon the opinion of the author from his
experience with approximately 1,000 cases since no-fault went into effect in Florida,
and at least that number of cases prior to the enactment of no-fault.
"In 1977, this figure was reduced to 80%. See FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (a) (Supp.
1978).
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jury lawyer was not called by a doctor or a hospital requesting that
the lawyer guarantee the accident victim's bill. The health care pro-
vider was not willing to wait years to see if he would receive his
money following a successful tort suit.
Following no-fault, the health care provider realized that no-fault
coverage was better than the private health insurance that the acci-
dent victim carried. No-fault paid 100% of the medical bills im-
mediately. There was no limitation on hospital room rates, on surgery
fees, and on the number or cost of x-rays; nor were there limitations
on the number or cost of physical therapy sessions. No-fault created
an incentive for overutilization by health care providers. Since the
enactment of no-fault, most orthopedic surgeons in Florida now pro-
vide x-rays in the office and many groups of orthopedic surgeons have
their own physical therapists. Since the enactment of no-fault, injured
accident victims who used to be placed in wards are now receiving
treatment in private hospital rooms.
4 3
It can be argued that no-fault has created an unconscionable con-
dition in the marketplace. The accident victim wants more medical
care and more expensive medical care, and the health care provider
wants to give more medical care and more expensive medical care;
therefore the health care provider justifies his overutilization by find-
ing that the patient has a continuing or permanent injury.
It can be argued that the overutilization of medical care by the
accident victim and by the health care provider which may be en-
couraged by no-fault has raised health insurance costs. Every time an
injured person receives additional medical care, he receives benefits
not only from the no-fault insurance carrier, but also from his per-
sonal health insurance. It is submitted that if the reader checks with
Blue Cross/Blue Shield in any no-fault state (after a couple of year's
experience) he will find that those rates are now approaching a crisis.
In 1977, the Florida Legislature reduced P.I.P. benefits from
100% medical to 80% and from 85% wage loss to 60%." This allows
the accident victim to recover approximately 160% of his medical
bills and 120% of his wage loss, which is still incentive enough to con-
tinue to overutilize.
At the beginning of the article, it was stated that rising
automobile insurance premiums was apparently the real reason for
enactment of no-fault. The following section will show that no-fault
has had the exact opposite effect.
NO-FAULT HAS CAUSED SKY-ROCKETING INSURANCE PREMIUMS
The Florida Legislature in adopting no-fault was trying to correct
"See generally C. Gregory, H. Kalven, R. Epstein, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
870-71 (3d ed. 1977).
"See notes 40, 42, supra.
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what it considered a severe insurance premium crisis. In 1970 alone
personal coverage, including bodily injury liability, medical payment
coverage and uninsured motorist coverage, on both commercial and
private vehicles paid approximately $140 million in claims."'
However, the no-fault experience apparently has failed to curb the
premium rises. In 1976, for example, approximately $140 million
was paid for P.I.P. coverage alone on only private passenger
vehicles. 6 However, proponents of no-fault contend that automobile
insurance rates would have been even higher if Florida had remained
a traditional tort state.
In order to substantiate the author's opinion that no-fault was the
cause of sky-rocketing insurance rates, it is necessary to find a
statistical basis that would disregard the effect of inflation, gasoline
shortage, speed limit changes, and the effects of overutilization. No-
fault does not affect property coverages. However, the same things
that affect the cost of personal injuries also affect the cost of property
coverages. If there are more accidents, then property coverages
should be affected the same as personal coverages. It would therefore
seem that if we knew what percentage of the automobile insurance
dollar was concerned with property coverages we could then deter-
mine the cost of no-fault.
Prior to 1971, the Insurance Department of Florida produced
statistics which showed the amount of premiums paid by Floridians
for so-called people coverages, that is bodily injury liability, medical
payments, and uninsured motorist coverage, and separated the
amount paid for all property coverages. They were as follows:
In Dollars % Of Premium Dollars
Calendar People Property People Property
Year Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage
1967 4 $152,000,000 $152,000,000 50 so
1968 4 175,000,000 174,000,000 50.1 49.9
196949 208,000,000 207,000,000 50.1 49.9
197050 247,000,000 243,000,000 50.4 49.6
"Report of Insurance Department, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commission
of Florida Department of Insurance 173 (June 30, 1971).
"Report of Insurance Department, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commission
of Florida Department of Insurance 200 (June 30, 1977).
"'Report of Insurance Department, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commission
of Florida Department of Insurance 180 (June 30, 1968).
"Report of Insurance Department, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commission
of Florida Department of Insurance 179 (June 30, 1969).
"Report of Insurance Department, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commission
of Florida Department of Insurance 177 (June 30, 1970).
"Report of Insurance Department, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commission
of Florida Department of Insurance 173 (June 30, 1971).
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Beginning in 197 1, the Insurance Department of Florida did not
produce similar statistics, however, the author was able to obtain the
following table from Allstate Insurance, one of the two largest writers
of automobile insurance in Florida.5'
FLORIDA
PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE




Calendar Bodily Medical Uninsured People Property
Year Injury Payments P.I.P. Motorist Coverages Coverages
1971 35.2% 7.0% 7.5% 49.7% 50.3%
19722 35.1 2.2 15.4 4.6 57.3 42.7
1973 40.4 1.2 12.7 4.9 59.2 40.8
1974 39.3 1.1 10.1 11.5 62.0 38.0
1975 39.6 .4 13.4 14.4 67.8 32.2
1976 43.1 1.4 11.9 11.4 67.8 32.2
In the hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce and
Finance of the 92nd Congress, the following appeared:
For the period 1959-68 the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Com-
mittee found the following earned premiums for auto insurance (in
billions): Property Damage Liability 15.2; Collision 17.6; Comprehen-
sive 9.4; Bodily Injury Liability 37.0; total 79.2. Thus, coverage
relating to vehicle damages represented 53.4% for the average of that
past time interval. More recently the percent related to vehicle damage
has increased. Thus in the October, 1970 issue of Trial Magazine,
Vestal Lemmon (President, National Association of Independent In-
surers) said (at p.5 6 ): "The typical, current package of complete auto
coverage indicates that almost two-thirds of the premium dollar is spent
for car damage coverages, and only one-third for injury coverages."
Subsequent oral estimates from prominent insurance industry of-
ficials indicate that the auto damage portion of the premium is rapidly
approaching 70% and has reached or passed that allocation in some
areas.
63
According to the testimony before the Congressional Subcommit-
tee, the insurance industry expected property coverages to continue to
take an ever increasing percentage of the auto insurance dollar.
However, assuming the Allstate experience in Florida is indicative of
what actually occurred in Florida following no-fault, we find that in
1976 instead of there being a dollar in people coverages for every
"Letter from Darrell W. Elert, Senior Actuary, Allstate Insurance Companies, to
Fredric Levin (June 17, 1977).
"No-fault went into effect in Florida on January 1, 1972.
"No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H. Con. Res. 241 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 319 (1971).
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dollar in property coverages, the people of Florida paid $2.15 for peo-
ple coverages for every dollar paid in property coverages.
Ratios may be a little difficult to understand. Total private
passenger automobile insurance premiums in Florida in the year
1976 totalled $970 million." ' Assuming the Allstate figures to be in-
dicative of the total industry, $318 million was spent on all property
coverages. If we assume that people coverages would have remained
approximately half of the total automobile premium dollar, then
$318 million should have been spent on people coverages for a total of
$636 million had no-fault not been enacted. Taking this assumption
as correct, the enactment of no-fault cost the people of Florida $334
million in 1976 alone, i.e. $970 million actual premiums less an
estimated $636 million if no-fault had not been enacted.
The insurance industry authorized Conning and Company to
prepare an evaluation of no-fault insurance costs for the American In-
surance Association which was released in 1977." Conning and Com-
pany selected twelve states that had no-fault laws and compared those
states with five states without no-fault.56
Conning and Company analyzed the actual cost of no-fault for
the "average insured." Of course, the statistics used in the people
coverage to property coverage ratio was for all insureds. Conning and
Company determined the "weighted costs" for bodily injury liability,
medical payments and uninsured motorist coverage before no-fault
and the same coverage plus P.I.P. during no-fault. These "people
coverages" before no-fault and during no-fault were adjusted to com-
pensate for external elements such as inflation and the gasoline shor-
tage. 7 To do this, they took the trends in "people coverages" in the
five pure tort states and used these trends in analyzing the no-fault
states. In the people coverage to property coverage ratio, there was no
need to go to other states to attempt to adjust the figures.
Eleven-of the no-fault states used by Conning and Company had a
"Report of Insurance Department, Office of Treasurer and Insurance Commission
of Florida Department of Insurance 200 (June 30, 1972).
"An Evaluation of No-Fault Insurance Costs, Conning and Company (1977). Conn-
ing and Company is a Hartford, Connecticut-based brokerage firm which deals
primarily in insurance stocks and bonds and occasionally conducts a research study for
its clients.
Numerous attempts were made by the author to obtain additonal data from Allstate
and other insurance companies. Those contacted refused to release any information
regarding the ratio of people coverages to property coverages on any state. It should be
simple for a statistician to take such ratios for all of the states and either prove or
disprove the relative cost of no-fault.
Sld. at 1, 3. The twelve no-fault states were Massachusetts, Delaware, Florida,
Oregon, Maryland, Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, Michigan, Kansas, New
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three-year experience. Conning reported that eight of the eleven states
showed an increase in premiums for people coverages over what those
premiums would have been had no-fault never been enacted."
In analyzing the Conning study, a very interesting trend appears.
The analysis of the no-fault states with similar P.I.P. coverages
($5,000 to $10,000 in benefits) indicated that at the end of the three-
year experience insurance premiums increased as the threshold
became greater.s Connecticut had a $400 threshold with $5,000
P.I.P. and showed a 3.6% savings as a result of no-fault. Kansas had a
$500 medical threshold with $2,000 medical P.I.P. and $7,800 wage
loss P.I.P. and showed a 4.2% increase in premiums as a result of no-
fault. Florida had a $1,000 threshold with $5,000 in P.I.P. benefits
and showed a 15.5% increase in premiums as a result of no-fault. 60
Therefore, it certainly appears that the higher the medical threshold,
the more disastrous the results of no-fault in regard to increases in in-
surance premiums.
In an effort to reduce bodily injury liability premiums, no-fault
removes the small lawsuit. Regardless of the threshold, no case below
the threshold can make a claim for pain and suffering. Actuarially,
the Florida no-fault law was supposed to prevent 92% of the accident
victims from making claims for pain and suffering. But as a practical
matter, this appears not to have worked. Although there are no ac-
curate figures available, this author has found in interviews with per-
sonal injury lawyers that less than half of the cases were eliminated by
the threshold. This simply means that approximately 42% of the acci-
dent cases below the threshold prior to no-fault, became cases that ex-
ceeded the threshold.
By telling an innocent accident victim that he must turn to his
own insurance company because he failed to incur enough medical
expenses to go against the tortfeasor's insurance, no-fault can be said
to give the victim a medical expense goal to shoot for. Subconsciously
the victim may find there is nothing wrong in wanting the person who
caused the injury to have to pay. He may try to reach the threshold,
thus promoting fraud and subconscious exageration. Therefore, it
could be argued that cases after no-fault are being settled for $1,500
or more because of a subconscious exageration of injuries.
From the above, three conclusions may be drawn:
(1) P.I.P. is a disastrous alternative. It promotes overutilization
and therefore must drive up rates which has a corresponding adverse
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(2) No-fault substantially increased the premiums on people
coverages in Florida and cost the citizens of Florida in excess of $300
million in 1976, alone, over the cost that would have been expected if
Florida had remained a traditional tort state.
(3) If the innocent injured accident victim is given a reachable
goal in order for him to recover against the tortfeasor, he will reach it
and fraud and exageration may be the result.
WHAT IS THE ANSWER?
There are two possible answers to correct the problems of no-
fault. One is a return to the traditional tort system. Prior to no-fault,
insurance rates were going up no faster than other consumer pro-
ducts. 6' We have never been able to effectively legislate away the
legitimate rights of the people. Prohibition proved this. There is
nothing more ingrained in people than the basic doctrine that if
someone injures another, the tortfeasor should be made to pay. To this
author it is immoral to legislate that a person at fault should not be
responsible for his actions. If a legislator has any doubts as to the
moral issue involved, let him sit down as I have done and try to ex-
plain to the innocent victim of an accident who suffered serious injury
and substantial pain and suffering, that the person who caused the ac-
cident is not responsible for anything more than the $25 traffic fine.
The injured client is left bewildered by an explanation that his only
recovery is for his economic losses against his own insurance carrier
which in turn drives up his insurance rates. When that injured client
happened not to have been able to afford automobile insurance
coverage on his personal vehicle and the attorney explains that he
recovers nothing the client is often left stricken.
The second possible answer is to make the threshold high enough
to prevent the innocent victim from having a reachable goal. For ex-
ample, a $50,000 medical threshold would reduce bodily injury
liability rates to almost an insignificant premium. Even a $5,000
medical threshold will substantially reduce bodily injury liability
premiums. Certainly, if death was the only threshold for a personal
injury case, this will reduce bodily injury premiums some. 2 However,
when the threshold is increased to realistically eliminate a cause of ac-
tion for pain and suffering in over 95% of the cases, then serious con-
"U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 422-23
(1975). A comparison of the average Consumer Price Index with the Auto Insurance
Rate Component of the Consumer Price Index for the years 1960, 1965, 1968, 1969,
and 1970 shows that insurance rates rose no faster than other consumer goods or ser-
vices during the time period 1960 to 1970.
"An Evaluation of No-Fault Insurance Costs, Conning and Company (1977). Conn-
ing and Company reports a 16.2% savings after three years on all people coverages
under Michigan's threshold of permanent injury.
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stitutional problems as to access to the courts is created. As has been
shown above, regardless of the threshold, P.I.P. cannot be conceived
as a reasonable alternative.
In order to have a high threshold which will withstand constitu-
tional challenge a reasonable alternative must be found. Since no
alternative other than P.I.P. has been suggested, the only constitu-
tional way to take away a person's right to pain and suffering is by a
constitutional amendment to eliminate pain and suffering. However,
it would be noted that such a constitutional amendment would be the
beginning of the end for the automobile insurance industry. If there
were such a constitutional amendment, nine out of ten people who
have private health coverage and 90% of the working people who
have income disability protection coverage would have absolutely no
reason to purchase bodily injury liability, uninsured motorist
coverage or P.I.P. coverage. Of course, there is a possibility that na-
tional health care will pass Congress, and with increased Social
Security income protection benefits, the only personal insurance
anyone would need is life insurance. If the reader or the insurance in-
dustry thinks this is a fairy tale, or that this is simply scare tactics,
they only need to look to Florida. In 1977, the Insurance Commis-
sioner of Florida proposed a constitutional amendment to eliminate
pain and suffering as a result of motor vehicle accidents. The people
of Florida responded with over 350,000 signatures to put the amend-
ment on the 1978 ballot. Fortunately, the Insurance Commissioner of
Florida realized that the people would actually agree to destroy this
basic right in order to save themselves from the economic destruction
apparently brought on by no-fault and he withdrew the proposed
amendment.
Of the two possible answers, the only real solution to this crisis is
as simple as the solution to most crises. In those traditional tort states,
it is necessary that legislative leadership be informed as to the results
of no-fault. In those states that have passed no-fault, it is going to be
extremely difficult for the legislative leadership to admit a mistake
such as Florida's. If the no-fault states' legislatures are not willing to
admit a mistake, then it will be up to the lawyer to make an effective
constitutional attack based on statistics.
Up to this date, all of the constitutional decisions on no-fault were
decided without the benefit of the statistics showing absolutely no
need for P.I.P. Likewise, these decisions preceded the disastrous rise in
insurance premiums caused by the P.I.P. It is submitted that no court
will have any reason to find no-fault constitutional in light of the ac-
tual experience.
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